**British involvement in Francisco de Miranda’s *Leander Expedition* (1805–1807)**

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The *Leander* expedition of Francisco de Miranda (2 September 1805 – 31 December 1807) became the first formal attempt to organize a revolution for the independence of Spanish America. This study reconstructs the relations of Miranda with British civil and naval officials both in London and in the British Caribbean possessions adjacent to the Spanish Main: Trinidad, Barbados and Grenada, as well as with his British volunteers, in 1805–1807. Though the London cabinet, being aware of Miranda’s designs, did not endorse them, the Venezuelan received extensive support from the British in the Caribbean, primarily from the Commander of the Leeward Islands Station Rear Admiral Alexander Inglis Cochrane (1758–1832) and from the Royal governor of Trinidad Thomas Hislop (1764–1843) who hoped that, if Miranda were successful, independent Spanish America would provide crucial commercial benefits to Great Britain. London never punished Cochrane and Hislop for their arbitrary decisions, just as Captain Home Riggs Popham (1762–1820) was simply ‘severely reprimanded’ by a court-martial for his adventurous failed attack on Buenos Aires from Cape Town in the summer of 1806 and continued his career. Thus, we may infer that the calculations of Cochrane and Hislop were correct, and London, not planning to prepare and promote the revolution in Spanish America, would have supported it in the case of its victory.

**Keywords:** Francisco de Miranda, Venezuela, Caribbean, British – Hispanic relations, Great Britain, Spanish American independence

Since 1783 Francisco de Miranda (1750–1816), a native of Caracas and a former Spanish officer devoted his life to fostering the cause of independence of Spanish America extensively travelling with that purpose around the United States and then Europe, from Great Britain and France to Prussia, the Habsburg Empire, Italy, as well as the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Scandinavia. As a result, he is known in Hispanic historiography as the *Precursor.* His designs eventually developed into plans for a military expedition of liberation for which he sought the support of a power, such as Great Britain, the United States and France that necessarily was to be set in conflict with Spain. Based on Miranda’s conviction that anti-Spanish sentiments were growing in the Americas, such expedition was expected to unleash a wide-scale revolution that would lead directly to full independence.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Following Montesquieu, Miranda admired the British constitution. In 1787, the Russian Chancellor Alexander Bezborodko (1747–1799) highlighted to a diplomat at his embassy in London that Miranda was an ‘enthusiast of England’.[[2]](#footnote-2) First-hand experience in the French Revolution strengthened the Venezuelan’s esteem of the British (and also North American) political systems. On 2 July 1795, in a pamphlet addressed to the French public in support of the Thermidorian reaction Miranda called to adopt the political examples of Great Britain and United States.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Miranda lived on and off in London (1785, 1789–1792, 1798–1800, 1801–1805) and throughout those years he established friendly relations with the former Royal Governor of Massachusetts Thomas Pownall (1722–1805) and members of various Whitehall cabinets such as Sir Nicholas Vansittart (1766–1851) and Sir Evan Nepean (1752–1822) who were ready to promote his plans. His earlier acquaintance, a London merchant John Turnbull was eager to finance the scheme. An entrepreneur and prize agent, Alexander Davison (1750–1829), who also happened to be a friend of Admiral Nelson, added his support. The Venezuelan also established and kept constant direct contact with the Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806) in 1783–1801 and 1804–1806 and with Henry Dundas, Viscount Melville (1742–1811) who occupied positions of Secretary of State for War (1794–1801) and First Lord of the Admiralty (1804–1805), among other men in power. Miranda also received financial support: 500 pounds sterling a year from the British government and 200 pounds sterling privately from Vansittart.[[4]](#footnote-4)

In the ongoing Coalition Wars, Spain became more and more tied to the British main adversary, France. Britain waged war against Spain in 1796–1808, with a short break in 1802–1804. Nevertheless, all Miranda’s attempts to persuade British authorities (and primarily William Pitt the Younger personally) in the benefits of his revolutionary plans struggled to gain ground. On 2 September 1805, Miranda, disappointed with the apathy of the British authorities, left London with his secretary Thomas Molini (ca. 1776-7–1834) and went to New York where he arrived on 9 November. The Venezuelan intended to rely upon his old North American friends with connections in business circles and claimed that President Thomas Jefferson and State Secretary James Madison promised him during conversations held on 7, 11 and 13 December to provide friendly, albeit indirect assistance to his plans (‘to wink at it’).[[5]](#footnote-5) An old friend of Miranda, the Surveyor of the Port of New York, and son-in-law of the former U.S. President John Adams, William Stephens Smith (1755–1816) introduced him to a young merchant Samuel Gouverneur Ogden (1779–1860).[[6]](#footnote-6) Ogden had grown rich trading with Haiti and was in a position to provide Miranda with the merchant vessel *Leander* and much of the expedition’s equipment. Smith also helped the Venezuelan to recruit volunteers in New York. Most of the recruits seemed to have been deceived in the process. For example, one recruiter, a butcher from the New York district of Bowery told them that they were hired as guards for the postal service in recently acquired Louisiana.[[7]](#footnote-7) Eventually the *Leander* sailed from New York with about 180 to 220 men instead of a standard crew of 60 to 80 sailors.

From the very beginning the expedition included British subjects as ordinary volunteers. Although the exact identity of many remain unclear, Miranda’s right hand man in New York was a British officer, Major William Armstrong.[[8]](#footnote-8) We have discovered only one British officer with this name and rank – one Major William Armstrong was promoted in 1800 and in 1805 was listed in the Late Recruiting Corps.[[9]](#footnote-9) In the expedition, Armstrong would serve as Quartermaster General and received the rank of “Colonel”, higher than other chief officers in Miranda’s adventure, ‘Lieutenant Colonel’ William Steuben Smith, the son of William Stephens Smith, and ‘Lieutenant Colonel’ George Kirkland who joined the expedition later, on the island of Haiti.[[10]](#footnote-10) Armstrong was engaged in secretly purchasing weapon and ammunition in New York. In early December of 1805 was sent to Boston where he met Miranda’s friends, General Henry Knox (1750–1806) and a wealthy Massachusetts lawyer and statesman Christopher Gore (1758–1827). The latter organized a meeting for him with New England merchants with a view to obtain a loan of 50,000 U.S. dollars to fund the expedition, but the effort was unsuccessful.[[11]](#footnote-11)

The dire question of how to finance the expedition was partially solved by Miranda’s British friends. Miranda arrived to New York with a letter of credit for 800 pounds sterling to the name of a New York merchant Daniel Ludlow; part of this money was paid to Ogden. In January of 1806 Miranda wrote to Ogden two letters of credit for 2,000 pounds sterling to be paid by Sir Nicholas Vansittart and John Turnbull and for 5,000 pounds sterling addressed to Trinidad merchants Joseph Lambot and William Brown with whom he established connections through Turnbull. This sum amounted to around 31,080 U.S. dollars, but to get an idea of the size of this figure at the time it is worth noticing that year the U.S. Congress had allocated 30,000 U.S. dollars for the construction of the Cumberland road (ca. 225 km) between the rivers of Potomac and Ohio.[[12]](#footnote-12) The expenses of Ogden far outweighed that sum (72,463.8 U.S. dollars), yet Miranda promised to recompense three-fold that figure if his expedition was a success – if it failed, the negotiated compensation could not surpass 20,000 U.S. dollars.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Finally, the *Leander* expedition sailed from New York on 3 February 1806. Rumours about Miranda’s plans reached the Spanish Minister in Washington, Marquis de Casa Irujo (1765–1824) who sent information about it to Madrid as well as to Caracas, Pensacola and Havana, thus granting the authorities in the region time to prepare for Miranda’s landing.[[14]](#footnote-14) Smith and Ogden would be tried for equipping an expedition on U.S. territory against a friendly power, but acquitted by the jury on 27 July 1806. Miranda would travel back to England on 31 December 1807.[[15]](#footnote-15)

**A narrative of a troubled journey**

On 12 February 1806, the *Leander* met a 32-cannon frigate HMS *Cleopatra.*[[16]](#footnote-16)It was searched and as a result between 12 to 19 British mariners were detained (Miranda’s secretary Molini states the first figure in his journal; other participants in the expedition who left accounts about it, the second). Miranda showed the frigate’s captain *Cleopatra* John Wight letters from Sir Nicholas Vansittart and Alexander Davison which testified that Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger (the news of his death on 23 January 1806, had not reached the Caribbean), Sir Evan Nepean and Captain Home Riggs Popham were well aware of the Venezuelan’s designs. Wight released the British subjects, let the *Leander* to proceed and informed his superior, Captain John Poo Beresford (1766–1844) that Miranda ‘fully appeared’ (…) ‘to be a person in the confidence of the Ministry’ and if he successfully revolutionized Venezuela and opened the Spanish American ports to the British commerce (Spanish Empire declared free trade in 1797 but the state of warfare ), then ‘the distress of the enemy would be enormous and that the benefit arising to Great Britain so incalculable’.[[17]](#footnote-17) The account of this encounter by Thomas Molini was not dissimilar:

Obtained from him [Captain Wight] a Certificate of his examination, in order to obviate if possible any similar detention from any other of his Majesty’s ships of War. To the honor of Captain Wight, be it said that he was struck with admiration at the grandeur of the Enterprise, and sincerely regretted that the Limits of his Cruise would not permit of his cooperation in so noble an undertaking. He further gave the General much information respecting the Coast, and wished him all imaginable success.[[18]](#footnote-18)

On 14 February, military rules were finally established on board of the *Leander* and the expedition was divided into regiments under appointed officers.[[19]](#footnote-19) Three days later, the ship arrived to Jacquemel (Jacmel), Haiti, where Miranda, through Ogden’s mediation, chartered two small schooners, *Bee* and *Bacchus*. On 12 March 1806, a yellow-blue-red flag was hoisted over the ships – thus Miranda introduced a flag of his own design for the future independent Spanish America. Financial reasons postponed the expedition which finally sailed from Haiti on 27 March – a delay which was to prove disastrous. On 25 April, the expedition was ready to disembark in Puerto Cabello. *Bacchus* and *Bee* were sent as vanguard.On 27 April, they were attacked by the Spanish coast guard (*guarda costas*). After a short battle, nine members of the crew were killed, 58 were taken prisoners and the schooners were seized.

On 29 July 1806, in the fortress of San Felipe near Puerto Cabello ten out of 58 captives from the *Bacchus* and the *Bee* were executed: by the decision of the Captain General of Venezuela these were all the officers older than 28; others were condemned to 8 to 10 years of prison in fortresses in Honduras, Puerto Rico and New Granada (later many of these would either escape or be granted clemency). Seven out of 58 captives were British subjects, all of whom bachelors: 1st Lieutenant Charles Johnson, 30, from Norwich, Co. Norfolk, a merchant who had claimed to have served as 1st Lieutenant in the 2nd (Queen’s) Regiment [probably of Foot] in the British Army,[[20]](#footnote-20) was recruited by Colonel William Stephens Smith in New York for the Miranda expedition as 1st Lieutenant, “private” Peter (or Paul) M. Naulty, 21, a baker from “Kelmanerod”, Ireland (probably Kilmagar [Cill Mogharaidh in Gaelic], Co. Kilkenny, or Kenmare Old, Co. Kerry), who, in his words, was recruited by Major Armstrong in New York and was a baker in the expedition, “Sergeant of Cavalry” Daniel McKay (Mackey), 24, a merchant from Dublin, “2nd Lieutenant” and the mate of the *Bacchus*, a mariner from Ireland John Moore, 20, “private” Robert Stevenson, 31, a worker from “Hardesquin, Denegall” (Ardeskin, Co. Donegal) recruited by the New York ship owner Daniel R. Durning who himself was captured with the *Bee* crew and died before the trial, “private” William Burnside, 31, a mariner from “Belimone” (probably Ballymun, Co. Dublin, or Ballymurn, Co. Wexford, or Ballymoon, Co. Carlow) who was recruited by the Captain of *Leander* Thomas Lewis. “1st Lieutenant” Thomas Gill, 29, was an Irishman who naturalized in the United States, worked as a printer and also became involved in the expedition. All of the captives claimed that they did not know the exact goal of the Miranda’s enterprise.

After the trial Charles Johnson was executed, Thomas Gill was some reason spared from death penalty, went to prison and escaped to New York on 10 July 1809, Burnside died in hospital in September 1806, McKay – in June 1807, Moore was pardoned in 1808, Stevenson – on 22 August 1810, and went to the United States, Naulty still remained in prison in the summer of 1810 [[21]](#footnote-21)

Meanwhile, the *Leander* first went to Bonaire, then to Trinidad and was finally approached by 18-cannon HMS *Lily* (*Lilly*)[[22]](#footnote-22) on 26 May. Its captain, Captain Donald Campbell found ‘the crew perfectly dissatisfied and nearly in a state of mutiny’ and convoyed the *Leander* to Grenada (28 May) where British Lieutenant Governor General Frederick Maitland (1763–1848) helped the expedition to get provisions.[[23]](#footnote-23) Captain Campbell was right: the morale on the *Leander* in those hard days was low, and the existing evidence seems to show the potential for conflict between North American and British participants in the expedition. George Kirkland wrote to Miranda about his fears:

(…) the American character is sinking in your estimation, and by losing your attachment we shall be compelled to suffer in the course of events which are to happen, the mortification and reproach, which many British subjects feel, and often express towards the American governement (sic!) and People. (…) I am not prejudiced against the British Government, or His Majesty’s subjects. I rejoice that their interest and national pride induced them to advance your object – and I shall use every mean in my power to conciliate and preserve their good wishes, and to promote a reciprocal attachment and good understanding between them and the American Officers who now are, or may hereafter be attached to your Army. – But upon the introduction of British Officers and Troops, into your service, I will presume General, that those Americans who are zealously devoted to you, and the cause in which you have embarked, are not to lose the place they now hold in your consideration.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Kirkland also stressed that if Great Britain was ready to help Miranda simply because of its own political interest, the ‘People of the United States’ were natural-born enthusiasts for revolutions of liberation:

That Nations are governed by their interest cannot be denied – Great Britain by rendering services in your revolution strikes a deadly blow at her most powerful enemy – the question then arises, whether she would engage in this warfare, merely to serve the cause of freedom and independence, aside from National benefit? She is glad to unite her naval power in these seas with your personal influence and resources, (without which she knows nothing can be done), against the common enemy. [[25]](#footnote-25)

On 6 June, the *Leander*, now following the HMS *Lily* convoy, arrived to another British island in the Caribbean, Barbados, where three days later Miranda met Rear Admiral Alexander Inglis Cochrane (1758–1832) who commanded the HMS Navy Leeward Station which at that time included 52 men-of-war.[[26]](#footnote-26) Admiral Cochrane had already heard about the Miranda expedition, though overestimated its size, thinking in mid-April that three thousand soldiers had already disembarked on the Spanish Main. Cochrane considered it vital for British interests to help Miranda and thus acquire commercial privileges in the rich American lands while also containing the advance of France.[[27]](#footnote-27) At his own risk, Cochrane allowed Miranda to recruit new volunteers on Barbados and Trinidad and promised him a naval convoy (‘at least a Sloop of War, and two Brigs; and probably a Frigate’) to guarantee his landing on the Spanish Main in exchange for future commercial privileges for the British Empire.[[28]](#footnote-28) Accordingly, Cochrane gave instructions to Captain Campbell to put the expedition ‘on whole allowance of all species of Provisions, and proceed to any Port or place pointed out by General Miranda’, to protect it during the landing ‘and after they have landed you will afford the General all the assistance you can – supplying him with every species of Stores he may stand in need of, and you will take care, in the event of his being forced to reimbark (sic), to place the force under your command, in such a situation as effectually to cover his retreat’.[[29]](#footnote-29) HMS *Lily* and other three ships were put at Miranda’s disposal.[[30]](#footnote-30) In letters to the First Lord of the Admiralty Charles Grey, Viscount Howick (1764–1845), the Home Secretary George John Spencer (1758–1834) and the First Secretary of the Admiralty William Marsden (1754–1836), Cochrane explained his actions and suggested that 5,000 men should be sent from England to complete the independence of Spanish America and thus ‘amply compensate to the British Manufacturers what they now suffer’.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Unlike Cochrane, the Governor of Barbados, Major-General Francis Mackenzie, Lord Seaforth (1754–1815)[[32]](#footnote-32) was cautious in his relations with Miranda. Asked on 17 June to supply provisions for 120 men for three months, between 400 and 500 stand of arms and ten six pounders, he told the HM Customs officer who had made the request that he was against taking ‘any *active* (italics in the original) share in the business, least by involving the British Government in disagreeable discussions with other Governments’. [[33]](#footnote-33) Nevertheless, obviously under pressure coming from Cochrane, he agreed to the demand citing the admiral’s opinion and thus laying all the responsibility on his shoulders. [[34]](#footnote-34) It seems that Lord Seaforth was definitely frightened by the Miranda enterprise and told nothing about this affair to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in London.[[35]](#footnote-35)

On 20 June, Miranda left to Trinidad where he arrived by 23 June landing on the next day.[[36]](#footnote-36) This island, strategically located opposite the mouth of the Orinoco river, was occupied by the British since 18 February 1797, but it was only formally transferred to the British Crown on 25 March 1802, following the Peace of Amiens. Just as Cochrane, the Governor of Trinidad Thomas Hislop (1764–1843) was eager to support Miranda without prior consultation to the authorities in London. The Trinidadian merchant Joseph Lambot had already established relations with Hislop who, as he told Miranda back in March 1804, had become a ‘warm friend to you, & to our cause’.[[37]](#footnote-37) There Miranda received money from Trinidadian merchants with the letters of credit he had received from London and claimed that he recruited about 250 new volunteers. He had hoped to get 500 to 700 or even 750 men, but acknowledged that recruitment had proved to be harder to achieve than he had expected.[[38]](#footnote-38) After the *Leander* sailed, Captains Donald Campbell and Henry Dundas independently of each other wrote that Miranda had actually 220 men (many of whom were British subjects) plus 75 British sailors on board.[[39]](#footnote-39)

These figures testify that the Miranda’s enterprise had acquired a very high profile on an island in immediate vicinity from the Spanish Main. In 1806 the population of Trinidad constituted 30,043 people (2274 whites, 5401 free Afro-Americans, 1607 Native Indians, 20761 slaves). Almost 56 percent of free Afro-Americans came from French colonies.[[40]](#footnote-40) Thus, we may argue that Miranda recruited at least 5 and probably up to 7 percent of all free adult males of Trinidad.

The new ‘Colombian army’ of Miranda included the following units: the First Regiment of North American Infantry, the First Regiment of Riflemen, the First Regiment of Artillery (all already established in New York and active from 14 February 1806), the Trinidad Light Cavalry, the Kingston’s Volunteers, the De Rouvray Hulans, the Corps of Engineers and a ‘Company of Spaniards’ which was meant to include recruited Trinidadian free blacks and Native Indians.[[41]](#footnote-41) Obviously, unlike men who joined the expedition in New York, the volunteers recruited in Trinidad were very well aware of the intended mission. Unfortunately, we know only the names of the expedition’s officers. One was a Scottish merchant John Downie (1777–1826) who had served in Trinidad Light Cavalry and who later was to make a spectacular career by joining the Spanish army as a volunteer to fight Napoleon in Spain; he was knighted in Britain and ended life as commandant of the celebrated royal fortress and palace of Seville.[[42]](#footnote-42) Another recruit was not British, but the French Count Gaston de Rouvray (hence, ‘De Rouvray Hulans’ regiment) who had settled in Trinidad after escaping with his slaves from revolutionary Haiti.[[43]](#footnote-43)

Miranda left Trinidad on 24 July with a convoy composed of HMS *Lily*, HMS *Express*, HMS *Attentive*, and HMS *Prevost* led by Captain Donald Campbell. On 3 August, the expedition disembarked at the Venezuelan port of Vela de Coro. By that time, the Captain General of Venezuela Manuel de Guevara Vasconcelos (1739–1807) had already convinced the local population that Miranda’s was a pirate on the British payroll. In official correspondence the Captain General claimed that Miranda received the British naval protection and financial support (here, as we have already seen, he was only partially correct) and thus ‘in reality he was no more than an instrument’ of the British crown ‘incapable to sustain its rivalry by the dignified means of enlightened Nations’.[[44]](#footnote-44)

The official Spanish account of the Miranda expedition highlighted the Venezuelan’s connections with the ‘sanguinario y maquiabellista’ (the blood-thirsty and Machiavellist) Pitt the Younger’.[[45]](#footnote-45) Back in May and June the people of Caracas had raised funds to help ‘our beloved motherland’ which was clearly in danger. A song denouncing Miranda as a traitor was distributed in the shores of the Spanish Main:

A ese vendido al ingles

Con su zarcillo en la oreja

Y su melena de vieja

Todo le sale al revés.[[46]](#footnote-46)

[To that traitor who sold himself to the English, with his earing in the ear and his mane of old lady, everything he tries gets upside down]

Though the expeditionary force quickly managed to occupy the port, the city silently resisted all the appeals coming from Miranda. [[47]](#footnote-47) Most of the local inhabitants either left to neighbouring villages or locked themselves in their own homes – just as Muscovites would do six years later during the Napoleonic invasion to Russia. Captain Campbell interpreted the situation in a way well-known to all revolutionaries who fail to change the *status quo*: ‘…the Spanish Government have succeeded but too well, in impressing on the Minds of the People’. .[[48]](#footnote-48) It is important to underline that British seamen participated in the attack together with the rest of the volunteers. In the first skirmish with the Spaniards about 30 British sailors were fighting along with men of De Rouvray and Downie’s units: four seamen were wounded, one of whom later died.[[49]](#footnote-49) On 6 August, the Spanish garrison captured three men; on 11 August, 20 men were killed in a skirmish and about 5 to 12 others were taken captives. On 13 August, having learnt that Spanish troops were approaching, Miranda with his expedition successfully escaped from the Spanish Main and again went to the British-owned islands in the Caribbean.[[50]](#footnote-50) The ship of line HMS *Elephant* which has been dispatched by Cochrane after the main expedition departed to assist the landing at Coro arrived to Caracas when Miranda had already left. The news of the defeat did not reach the British Caribbean instantly: on 15 August, Cochrane was still expressing optimism in a letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, stating that Miranda had crushed the Venezuelan forces of the Captain General and thus ‘the appearance of a British Force however Small, would secure him complete success’.[[51]](#footnote-51)

The Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica Eyre Coote (1762–1823), the Vice Admiral James Richard Dacres (1749–1810) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica Station of the Royal Navy, all declined to help Miranda. [[52]](#footnote-52) Therefore, what was left of the expedition sailed to Aruba, then to Grenada, and on 8 November 1806 returned to Trinidad.[[53]](#footnote-53) Even in such dire circumstances Miranda continued exercising his diplomatic and networking skills. Following closely the events in London as much as he could from Aruba, for example, he congratulated the powerful Viscount Melville on his acquittal after an impeachment trial for corruption charges.[[54]](#footnote-54)

Even after the failure of the attack on Coro Captain Campbell still believed that had Miranda fell short of his victory: ‘One Thousand British Soldiers He would in a short time be in possession of the province of Caracas, where He has numerous Friends who only want confidence in His Force to join Him’.[[55]](#footnote-55) Another naval officer was more perspicacious. In his letter to the First Secretary of the Admiralty the Captain of HMS *Elephant* George Dundas (1756–1814) described his impressions reasonably noting that Miranda was unknown in Spanish America:

(…) it appears to me General Miranda has been far too sanguine in his ideas of the attempt to be made on the Spanish Continent of America: That many individuals are anxious to throw off the Spanish Yoke appears evident. – that the whole of the province of Carraccas [sic!] (from the best information) seems ripe for revolt is true – but there is not a Man in the Country who will rally round the Standard of a Leader who cannot support himself: When General Miranda landed on the Coast – however he might be known to, however he might be dreaded by the Members of the Government – the name of Miranda was unknown to the populace – no Spaniard of the Middle Class – no Indian had ever heard the name of Miranda; Yet these were the people he had depended upon. – It therefore appears to me that General Miranda has himself been deceived, and in consequence has deceived others.[[56]](#footnote-56)

Most of the participants in the adventure left Miranda on Grenada. According to Captain Campbell, on Aruba there remained still about 200 men. In Trinidad, James Biggs, one of the officers who was with Miranda since the very beginning of the expedition in New York, said that 33 volunteers had an argument with the Venezuelan when they tried in vain to receive the negotiated pay for their service.[[57]](#footnote-57)

Colonel William Armstrong, the first Englishman recruited by Miranda in the New World, remained till the very end of the expedition. In September 1806, he quarreled with John Downie because the latter was not prepared to acknowledge his seniority.[[58]](#footnote-58) Nonetheless, on 18 September 1806, Armstrong wrote a letter to Viscount Melville describing the expedition and still asking help from the British Army and Navy.[[59]](#footnote-59) He left Trinidad at some stage between 19 December 1806 and 6 February 1807.[[60]](#footnote-60) In January 1807 Downie still expressed hope to Miranda that ‘the effectual aid and support of Britain to accomplish your grand plan (…) every succeeding event in Europe (…) will tend to push on our Ministers to embrace your Project, let then Apathy be so great’. Downie remained with Miranda till the very end of his stay in Trinidad and, along with the Venezuelan’s secretary, Molini, joined him on his travel back to England in the autumn of 1807; nothing could hint that about a year later he would become one of the most trusted military officers of the Spanish army and eventually also of the Spanish king.[[61]](#footnote-61)

Miranda remained on good terms with the captains of the HMS ships provided by Cochrane to assist him – with one exception. He would later complain against one Lieutenant Robert Carr from HMS *Attentive* for ‘a scene of ill-usage, insult and cruelty’ (…) ‘that it is difficult to conceive from a British Officer’. Miranda insisted on calling an investigation and even collected testimonies of five volunteers against Lieutenant Carr.[[62]](#footnote-62) Relations with Governor Hislop remained cordial. The famous novelist V.S. Naipaul, a native of Trinidad, found precise words to describe the Miranda’s situation:

It refreshed Hislop to be host to Miranda, a distinguished London man who was above colonial squabbles and colonial fortune-making… He was an exile, a maimed man; but he gave an impression of strength. He was the sort of man to whom people who thought themselves misunderstood instinctively turned, as Governor Hislop did now, and Governor Hislop’s enemies, and prisoners in Governor Hislop’s jail in Port of Spain.[[63]](#footnote-63)

Miranda encouraged Hislop to learn the Spanish language, a rare skill among British officers in the Caribbean. In 1810, Rear Admiral Cochrane wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty that still only one of his officers spoke Spanish.[[64]](#footnote-64) Back in London, Miranda was invited by Hislop’s daughters to attend their debutante ball.[[65]](#footnote-65) Other connections were also made in the Caribbean island. It was Miranda who recommended the first British Governor of Trinidad (1797–1803) Thomas Picton (1758–1815) whose career ended abruptly with a scandal[[66]](#footnote-66) to Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852), future Duke of Wellington. Picton fought under Wellesley’s command in the Peninsular Campaign from 1810 to 1814 and remained under his command until his death at the Battle of Waterloo.[[67]](#footnote-67)

Aware of Miranda’s plans, on 15 April 1806, Captain Home Riggs Popham, then station in Cape Town, launched a sudden unexpected naval invasion of Buenos Aires, together with 1500 soldiers of Colonel William Carr Beresford (1768–1854), without informing superiors in London.[[68]](#footnote-68) On 25 June, they attacked the city and on 2 July captured it. Popham transmitted the news to Miranda immediately, encouraging him to travel to Buenos Aires at once in order demonstrate that the adventure was not meant to be an act of conquest but part of a liberation campaign of Spanish America:

Here we are in possession of Buenos Ayres, the finest Country in the world, and from what I see of the disposition of the Inhabitants, I have no doubt if Ministers would accede to your Propositions and send you here, that your Plan would take as well from this side as from the other, try my friend to come out… I am so occupied that I scarce know what to do first, I wish you were here, I like the South Americans prodigiously”.[[69]](#footnote-69)

The First Lord of the Admiralty Viscount Howick suspected that Popham’s actions were connected to Miranda; he was not wholly mistaken, although the link was indirect.[[70]](#footnote-70) For propaganda purposes Popham ordered the manufacturing and distribution of silk scarves proclaiming in Spanish, the ‘dawn of meridional America’ and stating that the principles of the British invasion were ‘not conquest, but Union’ as well as the promotion of the arts, industries, and education, the protection of the Catholic religion, individual freedoms and free trade, all illustrated with an image of Christopher Columbus in the centre (curiously, the fifteenth-century Genoan is depicted with a beard and in the contemporary British military attire), the English lion clawing the French cock beneath him and – last but not the least – the portraits of Popham and Beresford themselves as well as those of George Washington and ‘General Miranda’.[[71]](#footnote-71)

Eventually, the Buenos Aires expedition failed. Local volunteers and the regular army firmly defended the Spanish Monarchy. On 14 August 1806, the British forces surrendered. Popham returned to London on 20 February 1807 where he was court-martialled. Yet at the end he was only severely reprimanded. In February 1807 a renewed British attack against Montevideo and Buenos Aires, this time without any direct connection with Miranda, also resulted in a fiasco, mainly because the local population saw the British expeditions as a direct attempt to subdue them.

What was the reaction of the coalition government, the ‘Ministry of All the Talents’ that governed from 11 February 1806 to 31st March 1807 to the Miranda’s enterprise and its support by many British naval officers and civil bureaucrats? When the news of the Miranda’s adventures in the Caribbean reached London, the Prime Minister was William Grenville, 1st Baron Grenville (1759–1834). He immediately acknowledged that William Pitt the Younger had passed Miranda as a sort of heritage:

In the meantime an immense question is opening by this attempt (successful hitherto) of Miranda’s on the Caraccas (sic!). The thing was launched by our predecessors, as a matter of connivance only, without any plan for acting in consequence of it. How far shall we now countenance it, or engage in it?[[72]](#footnote-72)

On 21 June 1806, King George III decided that Miranda should no longer receive British assistance.[[73]](#footnote-73) Upon receiving information from Rear Admiral Cochrane, the First Lord of the Admiralty Viscount Howick proposed to discuss the expedition and the Cochrane’s support of it at a cabinet meeting.[[74]](#footnote-74) On 13 July, he warned of the dangers of supporting the expeditions in South America, thus diverting the military forces from the British Isles and opening them to the potential invasion by Napoleon.[[75]](#footnote-75)

Finally, the actions of Cochrane were disavowed by the Cabinet on 15 July 1806:

(…) instructions should be sent to Rear-Admiral Cochrane, highly disapproving of his having taken upon himself, without instructions, to assist General Miranda by the employment of the ships under his command, and even to conclude a treaty with him; and that he should be directed to take no steps by which his Majesty can be further committed in that enterprise, but to adhere as strictly as possible to the directions which he has already received on that subject.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Even before the Cabinet decision the First Lord of the Admiralty instructed Cochrane that he was to ‘carefully to abstain from any measures which may tend to commit His Majesty’s Government to the future support of an undertaking, in which it has hitherto taken no part’, adding later that Cochrane’s steps put London before an ‘unprecedented dilemma’.[[77]](#footnote-77) The essence of this dilemma was interpreted by the First Secretary of the Admiralty William Marsden (1754–1836):

(..) it is not their Lordships intention that you should withdraw from the Coast of America the Naval force which, with a view to these operations you may have stationed there for the purpose of covering the attempt of General Miranda. To abandon those who, relying on your protection, may have exposed themselves to the resentment of their own Government, would be inconsistent with that good faith and high honour which have ever distinguished His Majesty’s Arms.[[78]](#footnote-78)

Thus, Cochrane not only was not tried for his decision, but in fact it could be said that he was allowed to proceed with aiding Miranda once he had already involved the Navy into the affair. Nonetheless, after learning of the cabinet’s decision, Cochrane apologized for his unilateral action, although insisting that aiding Miranda was in the British interests and adding that the Venezuelan needed two or three thousand soldiers.[[79]](#footnote-79) In a letter that Miranda received after his landing in Vela de Coro, Cochrane frankly informed him of the change in attitude in London:

Situated as I now am I cannot openly act, but *secretly* will give you all the Assistance in my power – I will take care that the Enemy’s Ships do not annoy you unless they come with a superior Force – but my authority extends no farther as Government although informed by me of your being on the Coast, have not vested me with powers to afford you aid.[[80]](#footnote-80)

Cochrane even asked Miranda to destroy this correspondence, but obviously his demand was not met.

Although London never seriously adopted a strategy of annexing the Spanish dominions in America, such ideas existed in the early 1800s and were usually justified not just by geopolitical, but also economic reasons.[[81]](#footnote-81) In 1806, a young British agent on Haiti William Walton (1784–1857) who would soon become a well-known writer on Spanish America and Spain proposed to the Prime Minister Baron Grenville launching an attack on Spanish America with a view to undermine the continental blockade by providing new markets for British produce and ‘prevent the United States of America from rising too fast as a great naval power, on the decline of the British commerce and carrying trade’.[[82]](#footnote-82) In the period October-November of the same year, the brother of the Prime Minister, the Marquess of Buckingham (1753–1813) also proposed to Grenville plans for invading Spanish America, as well as the Philippines.[[83]](#footnote-83) At that time, the Secretary of War and Colonies William Windham (1750–1810) similarly approached the Prime Minister with ideas and calculations about attacking Spanish overseas possessions, from Buenos Aires and Mexico to Manila and asked about potential cooperation with Miranda. Windham’s plans, however, were for annexation in order to prevent the French from establishing themselves in Spanish America. He sought not revolutionizing but obtaining possession of part of the Spanish settlements in South America: ‘A footing once obtained there, the rest would do itself by a mild and gradual operation’.[[84]](#footnote-84)

The failure of Home Riggs Popham in Buenos Aires provided new arguments to Miranda who even claimed to Cochrane that ‘[o]ur plans are the only great resource that is left to Great Britain’ in the global struggle with France’.[[85]](#footnote-85) He added:

I hope that the fatal consequences attending the Possession of Buenos Ayres by conquest, will open the Eyes of G.B. and shew to Ministers, that the only solid Basis for putting the Continent of S. America in a perpetual separation from the Mother Country and France, is *Independency*: It is a Circumstance *sine qua non*; and I remember when we received the *Capitulation* of Buenos Ayres on board the Northumberland, I had the honor to impart to you this *presentiment*, and fears, which unfortunately were already realised at the very moment we were talking on the subject. (…) You may depend my dear Admiral, that whatever may be attempted upon the Continent of S.[outh] A.[merica] with any other Views but absolute Independency, will never be *permanent* or *satisfactory* either to Gr. Britain or the Country itself.

With his characteristic relentless assertiveness but also typical emigrant’s self-assurance, Miranda believed in his success during the year 1807 claiming that he was “better acquainted with the Nature and dispositions of the People that inhabit those extensive territories”. [[86]](#footnote-86) In fact, Miranda never visited Spanish America since 1783 and his native Venezuela, where he planned to start his revolution, from early 1771.

When news reached the Caribbean of the resignation of the ‘Ministry of All the Talents’, and with that also of Baron Grenville, and the arrival to power of a new cabinet headed by William Henry Сavendish-Bentinck, Duke of Portland (1738–1809), Miranda immediately attempted to establish fruitful connections with it. His main targets wereViscount Castlereagh, who had replaced William Windham as Secretary for War and Colonies, and the still influential veteran politician Viscount Melville. Miranda said that Popham and Beresford had acted in Spanish America as invaders and thus spent priceless resources ineffectively and unsuccessfully.[[87]](#footnote-87) Sir Nicholas Vansittart inspired by Miranda attempted, though in vain, to persuade a new Secretary for War and Colonies in the necessity to achieve the independence of Spanish America, also, like Wellesley, citing the failure of Home Riggs Popham as his main argument against simply annexing the Spanish American possessions.[[88]](#footnote-88) Miranda found an advocate in Arthur Wellesley. The future Duke of Wellington composed a Memorandum for William Windham in which he envisaged an attack on the Spanish Main and on Mexico in December of 1807 which would result in the independence of the Madrid’s possessions and save the British from a military overstretch: “The only mode which I can suggest of effecting this important object, without incurring the inconvenience of maintaining in Terra Firma a large military force, would be to establish there an independent government”.[[89]](#footnote-89)

The discussions on the potential Spanish American independence and British commercial expansion to the region spread to a wider audience than government circles promoting interest among business people. Back on 6 October 1806, a well-known London painter and diarist Joseph Farington (1747–1821) quoted a London banker Craufurd Bruce (1748–1820) as saying that:

thought the capture of Buenos Ayres a great acquisition to commerce… it would be attended with the good effect of disseminating our manufactures into every corner of South America. That Country it was agreed can never again be held by Spain & the true policy to keep it out of the hands of the French wd. be to induce them to establish themselves, under our Naval protection, into a free, independent, government. It wd. require too many troops for England to undertake to attach it to Herself.[[90]](#footnote-90)

Upon his return from Buenos Aires and regardless of the court-martial, Home Riggs Popham received a sword of honour from the City of London for his endeavour to open new markets. All these ideas about Spanish America *de jure* independent but *de facto* closely tied through commerce to Great Britain to the benefit of the latter resemble a reader of the historiographical concept of the British free-trade “informal empire” in Latin America.[[91]](#footnote-91)

Regardless of all his social networking efforts, renewed attempts of Miranda to receive support again from Hislop and Cochrane were not successful. On 24 October 1807, Miranda left Trinidad and reached Portsmouth on 31 December 1807.[[92]](#footnote-92) The adventure was over.

Nevertheless, the Venezuelan did not lose his credibility in the London establishment. In early 1808 Arthur Wellesley continued to echo the Miranda’s thought, declaring that “any attempt to conquer” Spanish Americans countries “would certainly fail” and thus “the only mode in which they can be wrested from the Crown of Spain is by a revolution and by the establishment of an independent government within them”. He explained the Miranda’s failure only by his relative military weakness, and – if London decided to act in Spanish America – advised the cabinet to launch an attack in Venezuela since “through General Miranda the British government have the means of communicating with the people of that country, and have reason to believe, as far as his judgment can be depended upon, that they are inclined to a revolution”.[[93]](#footnote-93) Eventually, the British military expedition to Spanish America was prepared in Cork by then Secretary for War and Colonies Viscount Castlereagh and Arthur Wellesley in the early spring of 1808 – and Miranda might have been become one of its leaders – but the Napoleon’s invasion to Spain and the subsequent Abdications of Bayonne (May 1808) provoked a sudden change: Great Britain immediately became an ally of the Spanish Bourbons against France and Arthur Wellesley led his expedition to the Pyrenees instead of the Caribbean thus launching his famous Peninsular Campaign.[[94]](#footnote-94)

The French authorities learnt about the Miranda expedition from Spanish diplomats. The French Minister in Washington, D.C. in 1803–1811, General Louis Marie Turreau (1756–1816), not an experienced diplomat and much better known for his cruelty in the Vendée uprising, wrote to the Foreign Minister Talleyrand to say that Miranda had been sent by the British cabinet.[[95]](#footnote-95) Just as the Spaniards, the French authorities in the Caribbean were also unequivocal in treating the Miranda expedition as inspired and prepared by the British authorities though details varied. The Captain General of Martinique and St. Lucia Louis-Thomas Villaret de Joyeuse (1747–1812) first asserted that the expedition included just a ‘small number of adventurers’ but claimed that, according to his information, Miranda had obtained a credit of several million pounds from the British government.[[96]](#footnote-96)

The timing of the Miranda expedition coinciding with the attack of Home Popham against Buenos Aires served as decisive proof of British aggressive intentions in Spanish America. Rumours multiplied: by mid-July 1806 Villaret de Joyeuse became convinced that the Miranda’s army included ca. 4,000 soldiers including two corps of Africans.[[97]](#footnote-97) A French traveler and geographer, the author of the celebrated account of the Spanish Main[[98]](#footnote-98) François Depons (1751–1812) who lived in Caracas in 1801–1804 wrote two memoranda to the French authorities urging them to annex Spanish America before Miranda would hand it to Great Britain.[[99]](#footnote-99) There was also evidence circulating around that seem to support such interpretation: in April 1807, the French Minister of the Navy Denis Decrès (1761–1820) acquired the aforementioned propaganda scarf of Home Popham and sent it to Napoleon as a proof of British expansionist intentions.[[100]](#footnote-100)

Drawing the line, we see that in his 1806 expedition Miranda did not receive tangible support from British officers and bureaucrats in the Caribbean such as the governors of Barbados and Jamaica Lord Seaforth and Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica Station Vice Admiral James Richard Dacres. In London, the designs of Sir Nicholas Vansittart, Arthur Wellesley and to a certain degree of William Windham about a new British ‘informal empire’ which would have connected British commercial interest to Spanish America received attention but failed to materialize.

Nevertheless, Miranda did receive a critical level of support which allowed him to organize the second strike of his *Leander* expedition against the Spanish Main from Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Station Rear Admiral Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Governor of Trinidad Thomas Hislop and, to a lesser extent, Governor of Grenada Frederick Maitland. These supporters acted independently from Whitehall but apparently hoped that in the case of the Miranda’s victory and subsequent independence of Spanish America Great Britain would achieve large commercial and geopolitical benefits. The British cabinet disapproved of their actions but most probably would have supported them if the expedition of Miranda were a success – just as in the case of the failed attack of Captain Home Riggs Popham against Buenos Aires. The last but not the least, the British subjects played a significant role in the Miranda’s expedition, and its officers of British origin, William Armstrong and John Downie, seemed to believe in the eventual success of this enterprise till its very end.

The failure of the expeditions of 1806–1807 may serve an important commentary to the discussion of the dissolution of the Spanish Empire in the Americas: the Spanish ancient régime even in its reformed condition was destined to change in the nineteenth century under the pressure of anticolonial and democratic ideas of U.S. War of Independence, democratic whirlwind of the French revolution, and the nascent global industrial capitalism, but before the acknowledged royal legitimacy was destroyed by the abdications of Bayonne in May of 1808 the system still demonstrated stability.

1. The literature on Francisco de Miranda is extensive. For the most important works see: William Spence Robertson, *The Life of Miranda*, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1929);

   Carmen Bohórquez [Morán], *Francisco de Miranda. Précurseur des indépendances de l’Amérique latine* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998; 3rd ed. in Spanish: *Francisco de Miranda: Precursor de las independencias de la América Latina*, Caracas: El Perro y La Rana, 2006); Karen Racine, *Francisco de Miranda, a Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution* (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003); Láutico García, S.J., *Francisco de Miranda y el antiguo regimen español* (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1961); Manuel Hernández González, *Francisco de Miranda y su ruptura con España* (Santa Cruz de Tenerife: Idea, 2006; parallel ed.: Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 2006); Carraciolo Parra-Pérez, *Miranda et la révolution française* (Paris: Librarie Pierre Roger, 1925); idem, *Historia de la primera República de Venezuela* (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1992 [1939], esp. 3–194; Moiséi Alperóvich, *Francisco de Miranda y Rusia*, abbreviated transl. from Russian [1986] (Moscú: Progreso, 1989). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Alexander Bezborodko to Semyon Vorontsov, 2/13 October 1787, Moiséi Alperóvich, *Francisco de Miranda y Rusia*, 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *Opinion du général Miranda sur la situation actuelle de la France et sur les remèdes convenables à ses maux* (Paris: s.n., [1795]); *Archivo del General Miranda*, dirig. y revisada por Vicente Dávila (Caracas: Sur-América, 1929–1938, I–XV; La Habana: Lex, 1950, XVI–XXIV), XIV, 387–401. The Miranda archive which he himself entitled the *Colombeia* was recently digitized under the guidance of Carmen Bohórquez Morán and is now available online: [www.franciscodemiranda.org](http://www.franciscodemiranda.org) (accessed on October 31, 2018). The reference to the first archival folio of the published document is always provided in the *Archivo del General Miranda*. Throughout this article we provide the citation from the printed source and a reference to the *Colombeia* in brackets. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See their correspondence in vols. IV, VI–VII, XV–XXIII of the *Archivo del General Miranda*. On the money issues see, e.g., *Archivo del General Miranda,* XVI, 341–342; XXIII, 91–92; XVII, 219–222 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, IV, f. 92, XVII, f. 64, V, f. 292–293v). See also, John Lynch, “Francisco de Miranda: the London Years”, *Francisco de Miranda: Exile and Enlightenment*, ed, by John Maher (London: Institute of Latin American Studies): 122–53, [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Ibid.*, XVII, 287, 289 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, 115–115v); Rufus King to Christopher Gore, 9 March 1806, Rufus King Papers. Box 26, folder 4, f. 73–73v, New-York Historical Society (*The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, ed. by Ch. R. King (New York: G. P. Putnam’Sons, 1894–1900), IV, 529–30); *Ibid.*, IV, appendix IX [5 March 1806], 581). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. William O. Wheeler, *The Ogden Family in America* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1907), 154–8. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See contemporary evidence in, [John H. Sherman], *A General Account of Miranda’s Expedition, Including the Trial and Execution of Ten of His Officers*. *And an Account of the Imprisonment and Sufferings of the Remainder of his Officers and Men Who Were Taken Prisoners. Upon the authority of a person who was an Officer under Miranda, who was taken and condemned to ten years imprisonment, and who after suffering nearly two years, effected his return home* (New York: McFarlane & Long, 1808); *History of the Adventures and Sufferings of Moses Smith, during five years of his life; from the beginning of the year 1806, when he was betrayed into the Miranda expedition, until June 1811, when he was nonsuited in an action at law, which lasted three years and a half. To which is added a biographical sketch of Gen. Miranda* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Thomas Kirk, 1812 Albany, N.Y.: Packard & Van Benthuysen, 1814)*; Incidents in the Life of John Edsall* (Catskill, N.Y.: Published for the Author, 1831); “Diary and Letters of Henry Ingersoll, Prisoner at Carthagena, 1806–1809,” ed. by Edwin Erle Sparks, *American Historical Review*, vol. 3, 4 (July 1898): 674–702; Henry Ingersoll, [Miranda’s expedition], ca. 1815, Boston Athenaeum, S47. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 278 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 97), 27 November 1805. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *A List of All the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on Full and Half-Pay: With an Index and A Succession of Colonels*, 53rd ed., War-Office, 1st February 1805, 34, The National Archives (Kew), WO 65/55 – <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/browse/r/h/C4431918> (accessed on 28 August 2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. E.g., *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 370 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 255); General Return of Arms, Accoutrements, Ammunition, Cloathing, Intrenching Tools &c, on Board the Ship Leander, April 14th 1806, *Ibid.*, XVII, 377–8 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 269); etc. (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 380; XVIII, 66, 83; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones. VI, f. 271, VII, f. 113, 132v). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. William Armstrong to Francisco de Miranda, 27 November 1805, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 277 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 95). William Armstrong went to Boston on 2 December 1805: William Armstrong to Francisco de Miranda, New York, 30 December 1805, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 307–9 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 52). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Markus A. Denzel, *Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590–1914* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 304–5, 334, 350–1; XIX, 73–4 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 146–9, 195, 218–9, IX, f. 204); *Trials of Smith and Ogden*, xviii–xx, 107, 249; *The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, IV, Appendix IX [5 March 1806], 581–2. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Aurora. 28, 29 January, 13 June 1806; William Spence Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America*, 369–71; idem, *The Life of Miranda*, I, 297, 300–1; Irving Brant, *James Madison*, 6 vols. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941–1961), IV, 332–3. See also: Marcia Peña, Argenis Quintero, “La correspondencia que intercambiaron las autoridades de la Corona española encargadas de vigilar las costas de la Capitanía General de Venezuela con relación al desembarco de Francisco de Miranda en 1806”, *Las independencias de América Latina: génesis, proceso y significado actual*, coord. y ed. Carmen Bohórquez [Morán] (Caracas: Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura, 2009), 261–7. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The main sources on the Miranda expedition are located in the *Archivo del General Miranda* (first of all, in vols. XVII–XIX) as well as in the expedition’s official journal by the Miranda’s secretary Thomas Molini, contemporary memoirs of the expedition’s participants, and materials of the Spanish trial against captives of this ill-fated enterprise and of the North American trial against William Stephens Smith and Samuel Gouverneur Ogden who helped to organize it: [Thomas Molini], Journals. – 1805 a 1807, National Maritime Museum (Greenwich), JOD/141; [James Biggs], *History of Don Francisco de Miranda’s attempt to effect a revolution in South America, in a Series of Letters. By a Gentleman who was an officer under that general, to his friend in the United States. To which are annexed, Sketches of the Life of Miranda, and Geographical Notices of Caracas* (Boston: Oliver & Munroe, 1808), reprinted in 1809 in London, in 1810, 1811, 1812 in Boston; [John H. Sherman], *Op. cit.*; *History of the Adventures of Moses Smith; Incidents in the Life of John Edsall*; “Diary and Letters of Henry Ingersoll”; Henry Ingersoll, Miranda’s Expedition; Victor Schroeter, “Expedición de Miranda en 1806,” *Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia*, XXIV, no. 96 (oct.-dic. 1941): 405–410; *De Ocumare a Segovia (juicio militar a los expedicionarios mirandinos, 1806)*, equipo de investigación R. Berríos, A. Arismendi, et al. T. 1–2 (Caracas: Comisión Metropolitana para el Estudio de la Historia Regional, 2006); *The Trials of William S. Smith, and Samuel G. Ogden, for Misdemeanours, had in the Circuit Court of the United States for the New-York District, in July, 1806. With a preliminary account of the proceedings of the same court against Messrs. Smith & Ogden, in the preceding April term. By Thomas Lloyd, Stenographer* (New York: I. Riley and Co., 1807). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. On this ship see Michael Phillips, *Ships of the Old Navy: A history of the sailing ships of the Royal Navy* – [www.ageofnelson.org/MichaelPhillips/info.php?ref=0531](http://www.ageofnelson.org/MichaelPhillips/info.php?ref=0531) (accessed 29.08.2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. John Wight, “Memo for General Miranda,” *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 354 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, 224); Captain John Wight to Captain John Poo Beresford (in the Beresford’s file of 5 March 1806), “Miranda and the British Admiralty, 1804–1806,” *American Historical Review,* 6, no. 3 (Apr. 1901): 519–520 (also cited in François Dalencour*, Francisco de Miranda et Alexandre Pétion. L’expédition de Miranda, le premier effort de libération Hispano-Américaine* (Paris: Librairie Berger-Levrault, 1955), 126–8); cf.: [John H. Sherman], *Op. cit.*, 26–28; *History of the Adventures of Moses Smith*, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. [Thomas Molini], Journals. – 1805 a 1807, 13 February 1806. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 66–8 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 113–115v); [John H. Sherman], *Op. cit.*, 29, 42–3. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. We did not find his name among officers of all the 2nd regiments of the British Army in the annual Army lists from 1800 to 1805. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *De Ocumare a Segovia*, I, 133–136; II, 21–32, 189–98, 263–75, 293–304. Unfortunately, the editors of this volume published only 48 out 62 files of the trial and did not include interrogations of Thomas Gill, Daniel McKay, and John Moore. See also, [John M. Sherman], *op. cit.*, 119–120; [James Biggs], *op. cit.*, 239–243; *History of the Adventures and Sufferings of Moses Smith*, 60, 133–135. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. <http://www.ageofnelson.org/MichaelPhillips/info.php?ref=1336> (accessed on October 31, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Donald Campbell to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, 4 June 1806, “Miranda and the British Admiralty, 1804–1806,” 522–3 passim; Francisco de Miranda to Thomas Hislop, Granada, 28 May 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 385–7 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 278–279v). Rear Admiral Cochrane sent a copy of Captain Donald Campbell’s letter to the First Secretary of the Admiralty: Alexander Inglis Cochrane to William Marsden, Northumberland, Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 6 June 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2321, No. 153, f. 78. Many British officers and bureaucrats in the Caribbean were Scottish, often receiving their commissions through Henry Dundas, Viscount Melville. See, e.g., Douglas J. Hamilton, *Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic World, 1750–1820* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 175–6. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. George Kirkland to Francisco de Miranda, *Leander*, 4 June 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 387–389 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 284). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. George Kirkland to Francisco de Miranda, *Leander*, 4 June 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 387–389 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 284). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. List of Vessels on the Leeward Island Station under the command of Rear Admiral the Honble: Sir A. Cochrane, National Records of Scotland, GD46/17/24, f. 408. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Earl of Moira, Dolphin, Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, 12 April 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 7v–8v; Alexander Inglis Cochrane to William Marsden, 12 April 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2321, No. 125, f. 66 (“Miranda and the British Admiralty,” 521). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Francisco de Miranda, *Northumberland*, Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 9 June 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 392–4 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 290–292; National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 3r–6v). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Viscount Howick, *Northumberland*, off Fort Royal, Martinique, 10 June 1806; Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Earl Spencer, 10 June 1806; Alexander Inglis Cochrane to William Marsden, 12 June 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 13r–14v, 15r–15v; MS 2321, f. 79v–80r. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Donald Campbell, *Northumberland*, Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 10 June 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 15v–16v. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Viscount Howick, *Northumberland*, off Fort Royal, Martinique, 10 June 1806; Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Earl Spencer, 10 June 1806; Alexander Inglis Cochrane to William Marsden, 12 June 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 13r–14v, 15r–15v; MS 2321, f. 79v–80r. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See, Finlay McKichan, “Lord Seaforth: Highland Proprietor, Caribbean Governor and Slave Owner”, *Scottish Historical Review*, XC, no. 230 (October 2011): 204–35; Idem, *Lord Seaforth: Highland Landowner, Caribbean Governor* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Lord Seaforth to Hew Dalrymple, 17 June 1806 (two letters), Lord Seaforth to Captain Donald Campbell, 17 June 1806, Lord Seaforth to Matthew Coulthurst, 16 June 1806, National Records of Scotland, GD46/7/13, 234–237, 238–240. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Lord Seaforth to Hew Dalrymple, 17 June 1806 (two letters), Lord Seaforth to Captain Donald Campbell, 17 June 1806, Lord Seaforth to Matthew Coulthurst, 16 June 1806, National Records of Scotland, GD46/7/13, 234–237, 238–240. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Lord Seaforth to William Windham, 24 June (dispatched on the 25th), 2 July 1806, National Records of Scotland, GD46/7/13, 245–7, 257–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 26 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 36); [Thomas Molini], Journals. – 1805 a 1807, 20, 23 June 1806. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Joseph Lambot to Francisco de Miranda, 4 March 1804 – *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 22–5 (Negociaciones, IV, f. 225). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 29 June, 23 July 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 15–6 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 17); National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 14v–16v, 13r–14v; Francisco de Miranda to General Henry Bowyer, Bridgetown, 10 June 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 8 (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVII, 395–396; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VI, f. 296–297). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Donald Campbell to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Vela de la Coro, 8 August 1806; Henry Dundas to William Marsden, *Elephant*, Aruba, 22 September 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 27, 61v. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. A. Meredith John, *The Plantation Slaves of Trinidad, 1783–1816: A Mathematical and Demographic Enquiry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; 2nd ed. – 2002), 14, 17, 40, 42–3. See also Bridget Brereton, *A History of Modern Trinidad, 1782–1962* (Kingston; Exeter, N.H.: Heinemann, 1981), 33–51; Eric Williams, *History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago* (London: André Deutsch, 1964), 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 82–4 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 128–136). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Graciela Iglesias Rogers, *British Liberators in the Age of Napoleon: Volunteering under the Spanish Flag in the Peninsular War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 36–40, 104–12, 115, 164–165, 180–7; *passim*; Charles Esdaile, “Guerrillas, bandits, adventurers and commissaries: the story of John Downie”, Wellington Studies IV, ed. by Chris M. Woolgar (Southampton: Hartley Institute, 2008), 94–125. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 82–4 (Colombeia, Negociaciones, VII, f. 128–136). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. “Informe del Gobernador Capitán General Manuel de Guevara Vasconzelos sobre la expedición de Miranda. Caracas, 30 de septiembre de 1806,” *Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia*, 89, no. 350 (abr.-jun. 2006), 201, 209; “El Gobernador Guevara y Vasconcelos pide ayuda a Jerónimo Bonaparte para repeler a Miranda,” *Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia*, 50, no. 197 (enero-mar. 1967): 103–5. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *Retrato y vida del traidor Miranda…* (Buenos Aires: Real Imprenta de Niños Expostos, 1807), Carlos A. Pueyrredon, *En tiempos de los virreyes. Miranda y la gestación de nuestra independencia* (Buenos Aires: Rosso, 1932), between pp. 68–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Inés Quintero [Montiel], *El hijo de la panadera. Francisco de Miranda* (Caracas: Alfa, 2014), 120–122. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. See the initial optimistic accounts: Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Vela de Coro, 8 August 1806; Francisco de Miranda to Vice Admiral James Richard Dacres, 8 August 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 21r–22v, 23r–23v.; *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 117–119 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 187–8, 189–90); “Miranda and the Spanish Admiralty,” 526; also cited from archival documents by Julia Gaffield, “Liberté, Indépendance’: Haitian Antislavery and National Independence,” *A Global History of Anti-Slavery Politics in the Nineteenth Century*, William Mulligan and Maurice Bric, eds. (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013), 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Donald Campbell to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Vela de la Coro, 8 August 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 27r–28v. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Donald Campbell to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Vela de la Coro, 8 August 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 27r–28v. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. [Juan de Salas], “Suceso de la invasión y toma del Puerto Real de La Vela de Coro y ciudad de Coro. Año de 1806,” *Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia*, LXIV, no. 255 (julio-sept. 1981): 714–722; Marcia Peña, Argenis Quintero, *Op. cit.*; *Retrato y vida del traidor Miranda*…; *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 111–26, esp. 125–6 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 179–197); William Spence Robertson, *The Life of Miranda,* I, 313–6. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Alexander Inglis Сochrane to Viscount Howick, *Northumberland*, Trinidad, 20 October 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 32v-33r. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Francisco de Miranda to Eyre Coote, Vela de Coro, 8 August 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 119–120 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 190); Eyre Coote to Miranda, 16 August 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2571, f. 30v (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 138; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 223); James Richard Dacres to Francisco de Miranda, Pique, Port Royal, Jamaica, 24 August 1806, “Miranda and the British Admiralty”, 528; Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Aruba, 19 September 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 55v (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 167–9; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 28–29v). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Trinidad, 11 November 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2571, f. 164–165v (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 212–3; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, 123–123v); Donald Сampbell to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, HMS *Lily*, Aruba, 18, 19 September 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320. f. 42–43v, 49–50v. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Francisco de Miranda to Viscount Melville, Aruba, 19 September 1806, National Library of Scotland. MS 2320. F. 26–26v, f. 51–51v (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 170–1; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 30). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Donald Campbell to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Aruba, 21 August 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 32–33v. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. George Dundas to William Marsden, HMS *Elephant* off Aruba, 22 September 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 61–61v. Captain George Dundas was the father of a well-known traveler, writer and translator Maria Graham (1785–1842) who left accounts of her stay in Chile and Brazil in early 1820s. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. [James Biggs], *Op. cit*., 204–6, 221–9, 233–7. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 182 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 47). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. William Armstrong to Viscount Melville, Aruba, 18 September 1806, Victor Schroeter, “Expedición de Miranda en 1806”. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. William Armstrong to Francisco de Miranda, Port of Spain, 19 December 1806, *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 263 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 187); Alexander Cochrane to Francisco de Miranda, *Northumberland*, Carlisle Bay, 6 February 1807 – *Ibid.*, XVIII, 316 (*Colombeia*, Negociactiones, IX, f. 10). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. *Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 299–300, XIX, 114 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 362; IX, f. 276, 280); [Thomas Molini], Journals. – 1805 a 1807, 24 October, 4 to 15 November 1807; Graciela Iglesias Rogers, *British Liberators in the Age of Napoleon*, passim. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 17 January, 12 February, 5 March 1807 (with annexes), National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 78, 83v–84, 87–88v, 91–99v (*Archivo del General Miranda,* XVIII, 298–9, 332–3, 361–74; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 253–254; IX, f. 25–28v, 59–60, 61–73v). [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. V.S. Naipaul, *The Loss of El Dorado* (London: André Deutsch, 1969), 265, 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Francisco de Miranda to Thomas Hislop, 3 September 1807, National Library of Scotland, MS 13111, f. 79–81v; Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Charles Philip Yorke, 23 July 1810, National Library of Scotland, MS 2323, No. 840, f. 13v. See more details in: Андрей А. Исэров, “Неизвестные письма Франсиско де Миранды из Национальной библиотеки Шотландии,” *Новая и новейшая история,* 2016, no. 6: 173–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. May 6th, [1809], *Archivo del General Miranda*, XXII, 339 (*Colombeia*, Negociaciones, XVI, f. 106). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See James Epstein,“Politics of Colonial Sensation: The Trial of Thomas Picton and the Cause of Louisa Calderon,” *American Historical Review*, vol. 112, No.  3 (June 2007): 712–41; Idem*,* *Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington to Heaton Bowstead Robinson, 28 August 1835, Heaton Bowstead Robinson, *Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton, G.C.B. &c. including his correspondence, from originals in* possession *of his family*, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1835), II, 399–400; *The Gascoyne Heiress: The Life and Diaries of Frances Mary Gascoyne-Cecil, 1802–39*, ed. by Carola Oman (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968), 181–2. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. On these invasions see Klaus Gallo, *Las Invasiones Inglesas* (Buenos Aires, 2004); Ben Hughes, *The British Invasion of the River Plate 1806–1807: How the Redcoats Were Humbled and a Nation Was Born* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2013); James Davey, “Atlantic Empire, European War and the Naval Expeditions to South America, 1806–1807”, J. McAleer, C. Petley (eds.), *The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic World, c. 1750–1820* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016): 147–72. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Home Popham to Francisco de Miranda, Rio de la Plata, 20 July 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2571, f. 166r–166v. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Viscount Howick to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, 1 July 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2571, f. 105–10. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Denis Decrès to Napoleon, 25 April 1807, Archives Nationales de France. Secrétarie d’État Impériale, AF/IV/1192/2/15. The photo of this scarf (moved from AF/IV/1192 to AE/III/242) is now available on the website of the *Archives Nationales:* <https://www.siv.archives-nationales.culture.gouv.fr/siv/media/FRAN_IR_055193/A1_161/FRAN-AEIII_N302646N00001> (accessed on 31 October 2018). This scarf was also described for the Spanish audience: *Gaceta de Madrid*, no. 86, 27 September 1807, 999. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Baron Grenville to Lord Auckland, 5 June 1806, *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Esq., [formerly] Preserved at Dropmore*, Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, 30, 10 vols. (London: H. M. Stationery Office;, 1892–1927), VIII, 179. Later Lord Grenville would express himself in almost the same words: “…it is most certainly true that he [Miranda] was then, and I believe he was at a later period, consulted and countenanced by Pitt”. See Lord Grenville to Earl Bathurst, 7 January 1813, *Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst Preserved at Cirencester Park*, Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, 76 (London: H.M. Stationery Office; T.B. Hart, 1923), 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Viscount Howick to King, 20 June 1806, Anthony Aspinall, ed. *The Later Correspondence of George III,* 5 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962–1970), IV (Jan. 1802 to Dec. 1807), no. 3272, 456. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Viscount Howick to Lord Grenville, 7 July 1806, *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…*, VIII, 225; Viscount Howick to William Windham, 13 July 1806, British Library, Add MS 37847, f. 255–256. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Viscount Howick to William Windham, 13 July 1806, British Library, Add MS 37847, f. 255; *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…*, VIII, 236. See John Lynch, “British Policy and Spanish America, 1783–1808,” 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Minute of Cabinet. 15 July 1806, Downing St., *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…*,VIII, 235–6. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Viscount Howick to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, 3, 19 June, 19 July 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2571, f. 89r–90v, 94r–94v, 135r–136v. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. William Marsden to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Admiralty Office, 19 July 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2571, f. 133r–134r. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Alexandre Inglis Cochrane to Viscount Howick, Northumberland at Sea, North of Tortola, 4 August 1806; Northumberland, Barbados, 3 November 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 24v-25v, 33r–34r. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Francisco de Miranda, Northumberland, Tortola, 30 July 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 21v (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 135–6; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VII, f. 214–215). See also: Alexander Inglis Cochrane to Francisco de Miranda, *Northumberland*, Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 11 September 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2296, f. 27v–28 (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 176–7; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 36–37v). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. See, John Lynch, “British Policy and Spanish America, 1783–1808,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, I, no. 1 (May 1969): 1–30; Anthony McFarlane, *War and Independence in Spanish America* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 29–33. Nevertheless, cf. words of an unusually perspicacious political scientist: “The British had increasingly held open the option of a revolution in South America against the Spanish as a means of redressing the balance with Spain” – Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli* (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 2002), 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. William Walton to Baron Grenville, Whitehaven, 25 April 1806, *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…*,X, 457–64. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Marquess of Buckingham to William Grenville, 15 October, 13, 16 November 1806; Baron Grenville to Marquess of Buckingham, 31 October 1806, *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…,* VIII, 386–7, 415–6, 435–6, 449–50. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. William Windham to William Grenville, 11 September, 2 November 2, 1806, *Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…*,VIII, 321, 418–20. This position of Windham was noted by John Lynch who cited the letter of 11 September 1806: John Lynch, “British Policy and Spanish America, 1783–1808,” 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Aruba, 19 September 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 55–56 (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 168; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 28–29v). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Trinidad, 5 March 1807, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, 87–88v, 89–90v (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XVIII, 361–362; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, IX, 59–60). Also cited in Mario Rodriguez, *“William Burke” and Francisco de Miranda: The Word and the Deed in Spanish America’s Emancipation* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994), 119. See also Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Trinidad, 3 December 1806, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 69–70v (*Archivo del General Miranda,* XVIII, 257–8; *Colombeia*, Negociaciones, VIII, f. 176–176v). [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Francisco de Miranda to Alexander Inglis Cochrane, Trinidad, 4 June 1807, National Library of Scotland, MS 2320, f. 114v–115 (*Archivo del General Miranda*, XIX, 47; Colombeia, Negociaciones, IX, f. 161–162). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Francisco de Miranda to Nicholas Vansittart, 9 March 1807; Nicholas Vansittart to Viscount Castlereagh, 2 June 1807 (inclosing the first letter), Public Records of Northern Ireland (Belfast), D3030/2503, D3030/2504. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Arthur Wellesley to Lord Grenville, 17 February 1807 (with a Memorandum for William Windham, 15 February 1807), *Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue…*, IX, 40, 41–4; *Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, ed. by Arhur Richard Wellesley, 15 vols. (London: John Murray, 1858–1872), VI, 56–61. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Diary note, 4 October 1806, *The Farington Diary*, ed. by James Craig, 8 vols. (New York: G. H. Doran, 1923–1928), IV, 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. See John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, *The Economic History Review*, new series, 6, no. 1 (1953): 1–15; H.S. Ferns, “Britain’s Informal Empire in Argentina, 1806–1914”, *Past & Present,* no. 4 (Nov. 1953): 60–75; Peter Winn “British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century”, *Past & Present*, no. 73 (Nov. 1976): 100–26; Andrew Thompson, “Informal Empire? An Exploration in the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810–1914”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24, no. 2 (May 1992): 419–36; A.G. Hopkins, “Informal Empire in Argentina: An Alternative View”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 469–84. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. See accounts of this passage: *Archivo del General Miranda*, XX, 353–62 (*Сolombeia*, Negociaciones, XII, f. 91–96); [Thomas Molini], *Journals*. – 1805 a 1807, 24 October – 31 December 1807. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. “Memorandum, 8th Feb., 1808”, *Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Duke of Wellington*, VI, 62, 63–4. See also, *Ibid.*, 70, 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Wllliam Spence Robertson, *The Life of Miranda*, II, 18–23; Rory Muir, *Wellington*, *Commentary for Vol. 1, Ch. 14: Dublin and Westminster (October 1807–July 1808)*, <https://www.lifeofwellington.co.uk/commentary/chapter-fourteen-dublin-and-westminster-october-1807-july-1808/?highlight=Miranda> (accessed on 22 September 2019); Charles Esdaile, “Latin America and the Anglo-Spanish alliance against Napoleon, 1808–14”, *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, LXIX, No. 1 (July 1992), 55–70. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. General Louis Marie Turreau to Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Washington, D.C., 13, 28 February, 3 March, 28 May 1806, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de la Courneuve (Paris), Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Etats-Unis, vol. 59 (P/19543), f. 36–36v, 75v, 77–78. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Louis-Thomas Villaret de Joyeuse to Denis Decrès, 5 May 1806 – Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer (Aix-en-Province), COL C8A 112, Martinique, Correspondance Générale, 1806, f. 181–182. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Louis-Thomas Villaret de Joyeuse to Dorigny, 19 July 1806 – *Ibid*, f. 231v. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. See the first ed.: François Depons, *Voyage à la partie orientale de la Terre-Ferme, dans l’Amérique Méridionale, fait pendant les années 1801, 1802, 1803 et 1804*, 3 vols. (Paris: Colnet; etc., 1806). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. François Depons, *Mémoire sur l’expédition partie des Etats-unies pour la cote de Caracas commandée par le géneral Miranda créole de la ville même de Caracas*, Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer (Aix-en-Province), Amérique, 2400 COL 1–4; Idem, *Mémoire sur la cession de la capitainerie Générale de Caracas à la France*, Le Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de la Courneuve (Paris), Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Colombie, vol. 1 (P/11628), f. 4–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Denis Decrès to Napoleon, 25 April 1807, Archives Nationales de France, Secrétarie d’État Impériale, AF/IV/1192/2/15. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)